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Off-farm labor supply in Canada is modeled using separate off-farm labor participation and off-farm 
labor supply equations, which allows variables to affect participation and labor supply differently. The 
data used in this study are from Statistics Canada’s Agriculture-Population Linkage Database, which 
links the Population Census for 1986 to a 20% sample from the Census of Agriculture. Results indicate 
that age, education and wages have large, significant and opposite effects on participation and supply, 
and that government efforts to stabilize and supplement farm incomes through rural employment pro-
grams may have less effect on labor allocation decisions than do the underlying demographic factors 
and regional and farm characteristics. 
Nous modélisons ici les disponibilités d’emploi extérieur (hors-ferme) pour les agriculteurs, utilisant 
des équations distinctes pour la participation aux emplois extérieurs et pour l’offre des emplois 
extérieurs, ce qui permet de laisser les variables influer différemment sur les deux éléments. Les don-
nées utilisées proviennent de la base de données de Statistique Canada sur le couplage agriculture-pop-
ulation, laquelle relie le recensement de la population de 1986 à un échantillon de 20 % prélevé sur le 
recensement de l’agriculture. Les résultats font voir que l’âge, le niveau de scolarisation et les salaires 
ont de grands effets, significatifs mais opposés, sur l’utilisation et sur les disponibilités d’emplois 
extérieurs et que les initiatives de l’État pour stabiliser et compléter le revenu agricole au moyen de 
programmes d’emploi rural auraient moins d’effets sur les décisions d’attribution des emplois que les 
facteurs sous-jacents relevant de la démographie et des caractéristiques particulières de chaque région 
et exploitation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Determining the factors associated with 
whether a farmer works off-farm or not, and 
for how many hours, has implications for 
policies and programs directed toward rural 
economies and the well-being of farm fami-
lies. Farmers’ responsiveness to local market 
conditions, and how that responsiveness 
changes as the underlying demographic fac-
tors (e.g., age, education, family structure) 
change, will affect the design and effective-
ness of government programs. For example, 
a program designed to increase and/or stabi-
lize farm family incomes through rural job 
creation may not be effective if the offered 
wages are below most farmers’ reservation 
wage or if the reservation wage may change 
as age and education levels change. 
Previous off-farm labor supply studies 
have limited applications in Canada. Perhaps 
the most important factor is that the great 
majority of the studies were in the U.S. (e.g., 
Gould and Saupe 1989; Huffman and Lange 
1989; Lass and Gempesaw 1992; Sumner 
1982). Given common culture and technology, 
it is not heroic to assume that Canadian and 
American farmers have similar behaviors. 
Nevertheless, Canada and the U.S. may have 
enough differences to question the assump-
tion that off-farm labor supply is the same in 
both countries. Previous studies of off-farm 
labor supply in Canada are dated and/or are a 
simple reporting of cross-tabulations of char-
acteristics of farmers (Bollman 1973) or have 
estimated off-farm labor supply for a single 
province (Furtan et al 1985). Moreover, pre-
vious studies may have had biased results 
due to not adjusting for censored data; i.e., 
both off-farm labor participants and nonpar-
ticipants were included in a single-equation 
model (Furtan et al 1985). This approach 
restricts the variables that affect the decision 
to participate in the off-farm labor market 
and labor supply to the same sign. However, 
factors that affect the likelihood of working 
off-farm may not have the same effect on the 
amount of time spent working off-farm. 
This study estimates off-farm labor sup-
ply in Canada. Sample selection bias due to 
including both off-farm labor participants 
and nonparticipants in the sample is tested 
for and appropriate adjustments made. A 
two-stage model of the decision to work off-
farm and then the number of hours worked 
off-farm yields unbiased results of off-farm 
labor in Canada by region and commodity 
type. The data used in this study link the 
1986 Population Census to the Census of 
Agriculture. This paper is the first time off-
farm labor supply for all of Canada has been 
published using this unique data set. 
THE MODEL 
To establish an off-farm labor supply func-
tion, consider a farm operator whose utility is 
assumed to be a function of goods, G, pur-
chased for PG, and leisure, L: 
U = U(G, L), where UG > 0, UL > 0 (1) 
Utility is maximized subject to time, wages, 
farm profits and other income constraints. 
Total time available, T, is allocated between 
farm work, FW, off-farm work, OFW, and 
leisure: 
T = FW + OFW + L (2) 
Income is generated through wages, W, farm 
profits and other income, V. Wages depend 
on human capital characteristics, H, and 
labor market conditions, M: 
W = W(H, M) (3) 
Farm profits are determined by farm output 
price, PF, and farm output, Q, which is a con-
cave production function: 
Q = f(FW, X; H, E, F) (4) 
Output depends on the amount of labor time 
spent on the farm and other inputs, X, pur-
chased at price PX, given human capital char-
acteristics, H, farm characteristics, E, and 
family characteristics, F. 
Following Huffman (1980, 1991), our 
farmer behaves as if she maximizes: 
H = (G, L, FW, OFW, λ, γ; PG, PF, PX, 
H, E, F, V,T ) 
= U(G, L) +λ[PFf(.) – PXX + 
W(.)OFW + V – PGG] 
γ[T – FW – OFW – L] (5) 
Taking the first-order conditions of Eq. 5, 
assuming an interior solution and substitut-
ing, one can obtain: 
OFW* = T – FW* – L* 
= OFW(W, PF, PG, PX,T , H, E, F, V) (6) 
where * indicates an optimum obtained from 
the first-order conditions. 
Given little variation in prices and time 
available, off-farm labor supply can be mod-
eled as a function of market wages, human 
capital, farm and family characteristics and 
other income1: 
OFW* = OFW(W, H, E, F, V) (7) 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURES 
Not all farmers participate in off-farm work. 
To estimate off-farm labor supply, it is nec-
essary to have wage rates both for farmers 
who work off-farm and for those who do not 
work off-farm. The shadow wage rates for 
farmers not working off-farm can be predict-
ed from a wage equation estimated from 
information obtained from those operators 
who work off-farm. However, operators who 
work off-farm may be systematically differ-
ent in terms of unobservable characteristics 
from those who do not work off-farm. 
Prediction of the wage rate based on esti-
mates obtained from a censored sample of 
operators who work off-farm may be subject 
to selection bias. As a result, ordinary least 
squares estimates may be biased and incon-
sistent. 
Given that estimates of off-farm labor 
supply not corrected for censored data will 
be biased and inconsistent, a three-step pro-
cedure is used to correct for the censored 
nature of the data (Heckman 1974, 1976, 
1979). First, an off-farm participation equa-
tion is estimated in order to obtain an inverse 
Mill’s ratio and an earnings function for 
labor market participants. Second, the earn-
ings function equation is used to predict the 
opportunity or shadow wages for farmers 
who do not work off-farm. Third, the pre-
dicted wage rate is included for non-off-farm 
workers in the estimation of the off-farm 
labor supply. The econometric procedures 
are as follows. 
Off-farm labor participation can be 
modeled as: 
z = ax + u (7) 
where z = 1 if the farmer works off-farm, z = 
0 otherwise. Each farm operator has a reser-
vation wage: 
Y = h(H, E, F, V) (8)r 
and faces a market wage Y . If Y > Y , thenm m r
z = 1. Otherwise, z = 0. Y is not observable.r 
However, actual wages received, y, and the 
factors in Eq. 7 are observable. Wages 
received can be modeled as: 
y = bx + e (8*) 
where x is a vector of the variables in Eq. 8. 
z = 1 if wages y > 0, and z = 0 if y = 0. Given 
e, u ~ n(0, σi) with correlation ρr, Eq. 8* is 
estimated as: 
E[y | z = 1] = bx + ρσ λ(α ) + v (9)e u
where λ(α ) = φ(ax)/Φ(ax), and φ and Φ areu
the standard normal pdf and CDF, respec-
tively, for off-farm labor participants. 
Wages are then estimated including λ as 
an explanatory variable. If λ is significant, 
then the censored sample (i.e., only off-farm 
labor participants) is biased and Heckman’s 
procedure must be used with λ correcting for 
the bias. This predicted wage rate is used as 
an explanatory variable in the off-farm labor 
supply equation. 
Off-farm labor supply is estimated with 
the aggregate sample using a Tobit proce-
dure. A Tobit procedure is appropriate as it 
combines Probit and truncated regression to 
account for off-farm labor participation and 
off-farm labor supply (Killingsworth 1983). 
However, the Tobit model restricts the vari-
ables that explain participation and the 
amount of off-farm labor supplied to the 
same sign (Lin and Schmidt 1984). The sig-
nificance of this restriction can be tested by 
estimating the three models and computing: 
LR = –2[lnLT – (lnLP +lnLTR) (10) 
where LT, LP and LTR are the likelihoods for 
the Tobit, Probit and truncated regression 
models, respectively. If the restrictions 
imposed by the Tobit model are not valid, 
modeling off-farm participation and labor 
supply separately using Probit and truncated 
regression procedures is preferable. 
DATA 
The data used in this study are from Statistics 
Canada’s Agriculture-Population Linkage 
Database of census-farm operators, which 
links the Population Census for 1986 to a 
20% sample from the Census of Agriculture. 
A census-farm was defined as an agricultur-
al holding with sales of agricultural products 
of at least $250 in the previous 12 months.2 
The aggregate sample had 53,143 observa-
tions, of which 29,892 reported off-farm 
earnings. Summary statistics for off-farm 
labor participants and nonparticipants char-
acteristics are reported in Table 1. 
Twenty-nine of the 36 variables listed in 
Table 1 are significantly different between 
off-farm labor participants and nonpartici-
pants. Participants are usually younger, have 
more formal education and have fewer years 
of experience farming. Nonparticipants 
report gross farm sales almost three times as 
large as that of participants. Intuitively, one 
would expect farm type to be significant in 
explaining whether a farmer participates in 
off-farm work. This expectation clearly 
holds for dairy and beef cattle operations – 
i.e., dairy farmers are much less likely to 
work off-farm than are beef farmers – but 
differences are much smaller, though still 
significant, for other types of operations. 
Family characteristics appear to be impor-
tant. Nonparticipants are more likely to 
have a son and/or spouse in agricultural 
occupations. Having a spouse in a nonagri-
cultural occupation is associated with 
increased participation. Likewise, non-
participants reported lower spousal income, 
but higher farm income, family income and 
government support. Labor market condi-
tions as proxied by population density and 
the local male unemployment rate have 
mixed affects. Participants appear to live in 
more densely populated areas, but the differ-
ence is not significant, while the male unem-
ployment rate in their local area is signifi-
cantly higher. Lastly, off-farm participation 
is significantly different across Canada. Off-
farm labor participation is more likely in 
British Columbia, Ontario and Atlantic 
Canada, and less likely in the prairies and 
Quebec. Further details are available in 
Swidinsky et al (1998). 
RESULTS 
Probit Equation 
The Probit equation of off-farm labor partic-
ipation used to derive the inverse Mill’s 
ratio, λ (i.e., the ratio of the standard normal 
pdf and CDF for off-farm labor participants), 
has a pseudo R2 of 0.23 and correctly pre-
dicts 75% of the 53,143 observations. 
Twenty-seven of its 32 variables are signifi-
cant. However, as the purpose of the Probit 
equation is to derive the inverse Mill’s ratio, 
the parameter estimates are not reported and 
no inferences are made about the estimates. 
Wage Equation 
Results for the off-farm wage equation, 
adjusted for selectively bias, are reported in 
Table 2. Only 17,947 of the 23,251 operators 
who reported off-farm work also reported 
wage earnings. Hence, off-farm wages are 
estimated using the smaller sample. The 
inverse Mill’s ratio is positive and significant 
at the 5% level, indicating that farmers who 
work off-farm have unmeasured characteris-
tics that command higher wages than non-
participating farmers. Not adjusting for these 
unmeasured characteristics can cause selec-
tivity bias. Gunter and McNamara (1990) 
report similar results. 
Results for the wage equation are most-
ly as expected. Wages increase with level of 
education, and increase at a decreasing rate 
with experience. Wages also increase with 
the local population density and the local 
male unemployment rate. Somewhat surpris-
ing is that region does not significantly affect 
wages. It is possible that regional wage dif-
ferences are fully captured by population 
density and unemployment rate. 
Tobit Equation 
The single-equation Tobit model is tested 
against the alternate specification as outlined 
in Eq. 10. The resulting chi-square of 13,461 
far exceeds the critical value of 49.52. 
Hence, the single-equation Tobit model is 
rejected in favor of separate Probit and trun-
cated regression models. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of off-farm labor participants and nonparticipants, Canada, 1986 
Variable Nonparticipant Participant Z-test 
Human capital characteristics (H): 
Age (years) 47.17 42.51 –46.67* 
(11.58) (10.89) 
Education (years) 10.2 11.4 42.91* 
(2.98) (3.38) 
Farm experience (yes = 1):  
Started farming before  
1966 0.44 0.20 –59.24*  
(0.50) (0.40) 
1966–71 0.10 0.07 –14.40* 
(0.30) (0.25) 
1971–76 0.15 0.16 1.92 
(0.36) (0.37) 
1976–81 0.11 0.20 26.34* 
(0.32) (0.40) 
1981–86 0.20 0.39 48.75* 
(0.40) (0.49) 
Farm characteristics: 
Gross farm sales ($) 100,281 34,492 –95.95* 
(243,499) (94,002) 
Farm type (yes = 1):  
Dairy 0.18 0.04 –50.38*  
(0.39) (0.20) 
Cattle 0.20 0.27 20.38* 
(0.40) (0.45) 
Hogs 0.05 0.04 –10.21* 
(0.23) (0.18) 
Poultry and eggs 0.02 0.02 2.99* 
(0.14) (0.15) 
Wheat 0.17 0.15 –5.81* 
(0.37) (0.36) 
Other field crops 0.24 0.25 4.10* 
(0.42) (0.43) 
Fruit and vegetables 0.04 0.05 8.55* 
(0.18) (0.22) 
Other farm types 0.11 0.18 23.57* 
(0.31) (0.38) 
Type of ownership (yes = 1): 
Sole proprietorship 0.80 0.85 17.63* 
(0.41) (0.36) 
Partnership 0.13 0.12 –5.71 
(0.34) (0.32) 
Corporation 0.08 0.03 –21.14* 
(0.27) (0.18) 
Table 1 continued from page 5 
Family characteristics (F) (yes = 1): 
Son in agricultural occupation 0.14 0.08 –24.30* 
(0.35) (0.27) 
No spouse 0.18 0.14 –13.39* 
(0.39) (0.35) 
Spouse in agricultural occupation 0.33 0.17 –41.94 
(0.47) (0.38) 
Spouse in nonagricultural occupation 0.25 0.43 42.87* 
(0.43) (0.49) 
Other spouse 0.24 0.27 7.62* 
(0.53) (0.44) 
Other income (V): 
Spouse’s earned income ($) 3,992 6,012 32.12* 
(8,130) (10,111) 
Other family income ($) 3,102 2,187 –15.23 
(11,231) (26,249) 
Net farm income ($) 11,234 2,168 –73.01* 
(24,740) (15,323) 
Family and farm income ($) 19,814 13,310 –41.76* 
(29,097) (35,072) 
Government farm support ($) 21,855 7,753 –86.37 
(43,979) (26,088) 
Labor market conditions (M): 
Population density (persons/km2) 33.60 35.85 –0.44 
(98.14) (92.84) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 9.60 10.13 14.76* 
(4.46) (4.57) 
Region (yes = 1): 
British Columbia 0.06 0.09 16.90* 
(0.23) (0.29) 
Prairies 0.53 0.50 –7.62* 
(0.50) (0.50) 
Ontario 0.22 0.26 11.47* 
(0.41) (0.44) 
Quebec 0.17 0.11 –18.83 
(0.37) (0.31) 
Atlantic 0.03 0.04 6.39* 
(0.18) (0.20) 
Observations 29,892 23,251 
aStandard deviations are reported in parentheses.  
*Significantly different at the 5% level.  
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Agriculture Match, unpublished data.  
Table 2. An off-farm wage model for labor market participants in Canada, 1986 
Variable Parameter estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 3.416 65.02 
Education 0.53* 21.93 
Experience 0.035* 13.98 
Experience2 –0.0005* –10.81 
Population density 0.0004* 5.44 
Male unemployment rate 0.011* 4.80 
British Columbia –0.043 –1.35 
West –0.017 –0.97 
Ontario (omitted) 
Quebec –0.001 –0.05 
Atlantic –0.254 –6.245 
λ 0.050* 2.14 
Model statistics: 
Observations 17,947 
R2 0.43 
*Significant at 5% level. 
Probit and Truncated Regression 
Equations 
Parameter estimates and marginal probabili-
ties for the Probit model of off-farm labor 
participation and the parameter estimates and 
elasticities at the means for off-farm labor 
supply for the truncated regression model are 
reported in Table 3. Wages are adjusted for 
selection bias in both models. The Probit 
equation correctly predicts 95% of the obser-
vations and has a pseudo R2 of 0.50. The 
truncated regression equation has a log like-
lihood of –137,083. Twenty-nine of 34 vari-
ables are significant (at the 5% level) in the 
Probit equation and 18 of 34 in the truncated 
regression equation. Fourteen of the vari-
ables have different signs in the two models. 
Human capital, H, as proxied by age, 
education, experience and wages is signifi-
cant in explaining both labor participation 
and labor supply. As age increases, the prob-
ability of working off-farm decreases at an 
increasing rate, but the amount of time 
worked off-farm increases at a decreasing 
rate with age. Education also has mixed 
signs. An increase in education has the great-
est negative marginal affect of all the vari-
ables on the probability of working off-farm, 
but for those farmers who do work off-farm, 
education increases the number of hours 
worked off-farm. The more experience a 
farmer has, as indicated by when the farmer 
first entered into farming, appears to 
decrease both the probability of labor partic-
ipation and labor supply. However, a farmer 
with five to ten years’ experience is more 
likely to work off-farm than farmers with 
either less or more experience, while labor 
supply more consistently decreases with 
years of experience. 
Wages are significant in both equations, 
but positive for labor participation and nega-
tive for labor supply. This backward-bending 
labor supply curve is consistent with theory 
and is discussed later. Wages are highly sig-
nificant in both equations and the marginal 
probability of wages in labor participation is 
the fourth highest and the elasticity of wages 
is relatively high in labor supply. 
Farm characteristics, E, are significant 
in both equations. Size of operation as indi-
cated by gross farm sales is negative and sig-
nificant in both models, as expected. Type of 
farm is significant in off-farm participation 
for seven of the eight farm types modeled, 
but only two farm types are significant in 
Table 3. Probit model of off-farm labor participation and truncated regression model of off-farm labor 
supply in Canada, 1986a 
Probit model of Truncated regression model 
off-farm labor participation of off-farm labor supply 
Variable  Parameter Marginal probability Parameter Elasticity 
Intercept –88.83* –32.20 304.9 
(–117.1) (4.41) 
Human capital (H): 
Age –1.99* –0.72 10.76* 2.625 
(–112.14) (6.73) 
Age2  0.02* 0.007 –0.117 –1.30 
(108.69)  (–7.309) 
Education  –2.529* –0.917 10.116* 0.662 
(–95.297) (4.856) 
Farm experience: 
Entry before 1966 0.041 0.015 –21.515* –0.024 
(1.292) (–6.832) 
Entry 1966–1971 –0.131* –0.047 –3.069 
(–3.128) (–0.764) 
Entry 1971–1976 (omitted) 
Entry 1976–1981 0.403* 0.146 16.582* 0.019 
(11.739) (5.750) 
Entry 1981–1986 0.263* 0.095 16.581* 0.036 
(8.288) (6.102) 
Wage 36.900* 0.375 –52.065* –0.299 
(122.809)  (–01.973) 
Farm (E): 
Gross farm sales –0.481* –0.174 –18.207* –0.105 
(–46.865) (–21.417) 
Type: 
Dairy –1.389* –0.503 –52.824 –0.012 
(–31.411) (–9.236) 
Cattle –0.137* –0.050 0.204 0.0003 
(–4.464) (0.078) 
Hogs –0.800* –0.290` –4.567 –0.0009 
(–15.543) (–0.888) 
Poultry –0.174* –0.063 8.485 0.001 
(–2.361) (1.471) 
Wheat 0.053 0.019 14.007* 0.012 
(1.653) (4.697) 
Crops (omitted) 
Fruits and vegetables –0.409* –0.148 –4.259 –0.001 
(–7.824) (–0.984) 
Other –0.659* –0.239 –12.115* –0.013 
(–16.449) (–3.557) 
Business organization: 
Sole proprietorship –0.024 –0.009 –3.879 
(–0.812) (–1.422) 
Corporation –0.458* –0.166 17.603* 
(–8.701) (3.258) 
Partnership (omitted) 
Family (F): 
Son 0.078* 0.028 –4.543 
(2.194) (–1.317) 
No spouse –0.682* –0.247 –31.524* 
(–22.006) (–10.676) 
Spouse employed in 
agricultural –0.426* –0.154 –29.023* 
(–14.904) (–10.328) 
Spouse nonagricultural 0.195* 0.071 –6.063* 
(6.632) (–2.565) 
Other spouse (omitted) 
Exogenous income (V): 
Spouse’s income –0.041* –0.015 2.699* 
(–3.271) (2.793) 
Investment income –0.020* –0.007 –0.103 
(–6.956) (–0.345) 
Farm net income –0.131* –0.047 –0.080 
(–24.181) (–0.7250 
Government support income –0.036* –0.013 –3.493* 
(–5.870) (–6.762) 
Labor market conditions (M): 
Population density –0.015* –0.006 0.069* 
(–90.694) (4.914) 
Male unemployment –0.353* –0.128 –0.603 
(–84.289) (–1.584) 
Region: 
British Columbia 0.817* 0.296 –32.046* 
(16.498) (–7.810) 
Prairies 0.210* 0.076 –33.548* 
(7.413) (–14.370) 
Ontario (omitted) 
Quebec –0.636* –0.231 –35.930* 
(–15.501) (–9.689) 
Atlantic Canada 8.926* 3.236 –26.522 
(93.101) (–3.204) 
–0.019 
0.003 
–0.002 
–0.025 
–0.029 
–0.015 
0.009 
–0.0001 
–0.00008 
–0.136 
0.014 
–0.035 
–0.017 
–0.095 
–0.023 
–0.006 
Model statistics: 
Observations 
Chi-square 
Correlation coefficient 
Log likelihood 
Total percentage 
correctly predicted 
53,143 
52,822 
0.50 
–10,008 
95 
23,251 
–137,080 
a t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
labor supply. Dairy operations have the 
largest decrease in marginal probability of 
off-farm participation, followed by hog oper-
ations and “others.” Both dairy and hogs are 
negative, but not significant in labor supply. 
Having a wheat farm has a positive effect on 
both off-farm participation and labor supply, 
but it is significant in only labor supply. 
Type of business organization is the 
other farm characteristic included. Being a 
sole proprietorship has no significant effect 
on either labor participation or labor supply. 
Being incorporated has a significant negative 
effect on labor participation and a significant 
positive effect on labor supply. 
Family characteristics, F, has mixed 
effects. Having a son working on the farm 
increases the probability of off-farm work, 
but decreases (not significantly) the number 
of hours worked. Not having a spouse is neg-
ative and significant in both equations, as is 
having a spouse who works in agriculture. 
However, a spouse working but not in agri-
culture has a significant and positive affect 
on off-farm participation and a negative and 
significant effect on the amount of labor sup-
plied. 
Exogenous income, V, also had mixed 
effects. Spouse’s income is significant in 
both equations, but it is negative in off-farm 
participation and positive in labor supply. 
Other exogenous income has a negative and 
significant affect on off-farm participation. 
Government support payments are negative 
and significant in decreasing both off-farm 
participation and labor supplied. 
Labor market conditions, M, have 
small, significant affects on labor participa-
tion and supply. Increased population densi-
ty is negatively associated with off-farm par-
ticipation but positive in labor supply. The 
male unemployment rate is negative in both 
equations, but significant only in off-farm 
participation. 
Lastly, region of Canada has a signifi-
cant effect on the parameter estimates in both 
equations. Compared with Ontario (the omit-
ted region), all other regions except for 
Quebec have greater labor participation but a 
lower labor supply. 
DISCUSSION 
Using two separate equations to estimate off-
farm labor participation and labor supply 
allows for mixed effects, and hence insights, 
that would not be possible from a single-
equation model. Fourteen of the variables 
have different signs in the Probit and truncat-
ed regression equations. A single-equation 
model would have restricted these variables 
to one sign, limiting the explanatory power 
of the model. 
An example of the insights gained 
through the two-equation approach is how 
human capital, H, as proxied by age, educa-
tion, experience and wages, affected off-farm 
labor participation and labor supply. In the 
unreported single-equation Tobit model of 
labor supply, education is negative. 
However, in the two-equation model, more 
education decreases the likelihood of off-
farm labor participation, but increases the 
hours worked for those who do work off-
farm. A reasonable explanation of these 
opposite signs is that the marginal productiv-
ity of farm work likely increases with educa-
tion, which increases the returns from farm 
work and decreases the need to supplement 
farm income with off-farm work. However, 
for those who do work off-farm, their higher 
education also increases their value off-farm 
in terms of higher wages and hence the num-
ber of hours worked. Note that human capi-
tal, in particular age and education, has the 
largest effect of all the variables in terms of 
marginal probabilities and elasticities on 
labor participation and labor supply, respec-
tively. 
Experience affects labor participation 
and supply differently, and is also different 
from age. Whereas participation decreases at 
a decreasing rate with age, participation has 
a U-shaped response to experience. Farmers 
with 0–9 years experience and more than 20 
years of experience have a greater probabili-
ty of working off-farm than do those farmers 
with 10–20 years of experience. It is possible 
that this U-shaped response is related to the 
standard growth curve of a business, in 
which more time and effort is required in the 
middle to high growth phase than in the 
early, start-up or later, mature phases of a 
business. Labor supply also has different 
responses to age and experience. Supply 
increases at a decreasing rate with age, but 
decreases with years of experience. Hence, 
age and experience should be not viewed as 
equivalent. A 60-year-old farmer with 20 
years of farm experience will likely have a 
different off-farm labor supply from a 60-
year-old farmer with 40 years of farm expe-
rience. 
Wages also have mixed signs in the two 
equations. It is expected that higher wages 
lead to greater likelihood of working off-
farm, as indicated by the positive wage para-
meter in the participation equation and as has 
been reported in previous studies (Sumner 
1982; Furtan et al 1985). Hence, the negative 
sign in the labor supply equation is unex-
pected. However, a backward-bending labor 
supply curve is consistent with the underly-
ing theory and can be explained. It is reason-
able that there is a threshold of total wages 
desired to supplement farm income. Beyond 
that threshold, farmers would rather spend 
more time on the farm or on leisure and less 
time working off-farm. Moreover, experi-
ence and education, which increase the off-
farm wage, also increase the marginal value 
of labor on the farm, increasing the cost of 
foregone farm work. Hence, while higher 
wages increase the probability of off-farm 
participation, higher wages are also associat-
ed with a decreased labor supply for those 
farmers who do work off-farm. 
Farm characteristics, E, have expected 
signs. Gross farm sales as a proxy for size are 
negative in both labor participation and labor 
supply, as expected. The larger the operation, 
the less likelihood of working off-farm. 
Regardless of the farmer’s productivity on a 
per-unit basis (e.g., acres, head), the opportu-
nity cost of time away from the farm is 
greater for the operator of a larger farm. In 
effect, the reservation wage of the large farm 
operator is higher than the reservation wage 
of a farm small operator. 
Farm type also yields expected signs. 
The negative, significant sign for dairy oper-
ations has the third largest marginal proba-
bility in the labor participation equation. 
Only age and education have a larger effect 
on the probability of working off-farm. The 
relatively inelastic response in the labor sup-
ply equation is consistent with expectations: 
ceteris paribus, dairy farmers have a high 
marginal value of their labor on the farm and 
not a lot of flexibility with their time. Hogs 
and fruits and vegetables have similar signs 
and responses, only of a lesser magnitude. 
The signs on cattle and poultry are somewhat 
unexpected. The authors’ bias is that both are 
part-time enterprises; hence, the negative 
signs for labor participation are unexpected. 
However, their signs for labor supply are 
positive but not significant. Regardless of 
sign and significance, the marginal impacts 
and elasticities indicate that having a cattle or 
poultry operation does not have a large 
impact on either labor participation or labor 
supply. A similar story can be told for wheat: 
it is positive in both equations, significant 
only in labor supply, but the marginal proba-
bility and elasticity are so small that ceteris 
paribus being a wheat farmer has little 
impact on labor participation or supply. 
“Other” types of operations have nega-
tive, significant signs in both equations, but it 
is difficult to determine what, if anything, the 
estimates indicate. It could be that farmers of 
uncommon or nontraditional enterprises are 
less likely to work off-farm and, when they 
do, it is for fewer hours. 
Type of business organization is expect-
ed to have a more significant impact. 
Partnership is omitted as the default. Sole 
proprietorships are expected to be mostly 
smaller farms, on which the farmers are more 
likely to work off-farm, while members of 
corporations are expected to have larger 
operations with less likelihood of work off-
farm. The signs on corporation are as expect-
ed, but the negative and not significant para-
meter on sole proprietorship is unexpected. 
Given the relatively low income level at 
which the maximum Canadian marginal tax 
rate applies and given the tax savings real-
ized through incorporation, type of business 
organization may not be important in esti-
mating and determining behavior of farm 
operators. In the past, incorporation indicat-
ed a large, highly profitable farm. Today, 
given our tax structure, type of business 
organization may have little bearing on the 
relative size and profitability of a farm enter-
prise. 
Family characteristics, F, appear to 
affect both labor participation and labor sup-
ply. Previous studies have reported that the 
farm operator and spouse’s labor allocation 
decisions are jointly determined (Huffman 
and Lange 1989; Lass and Gempesaw 1992). 
Having a spouse, and the type of work the 
spouse does, has a much larger impact on 
labor participation than does having a son 
working on the farm. Moreover, having a 
spouse working, but in not in agriculture, has 
more than twice the effect on labor participa-
tion as having a son. Hence, having a spouse 
working outside agriculture may be indica-
tive of a family receptive to opportunities 
off-farm, while having a spouse working in 
agriculture may indicate a family view of 
few options off-farm. However, in the labor 
supply equation, all the family characteristic 
variables are very inelastic, indicating that 
family structure may affect labor participa-
tion, but that it has a relatively small effect 
on labor supply. 
Exogenous income, V, is expected be 
negative in both labor participation and labor 
supply. Hence, the positive, and significant, 
sign on spouse’s income in labor supply is 
somewhat surprising and difficult to explain. 
The magnitudes of the marginal probabilities 
on labor participation should be noted. Both 
net farm income and spouse’s income have a 
larger effect on labor participation than does 
government support. Hence, changes in farm 
income and the long-term trend of increased 
labor participation by farm wives can be 
expected to have a larger impact on off-farm 
work than changes in government programs. 
Local labor market conditions, M, also 
have a smaller effect on the probability of 
working off-farm than expected. Both farm 
type and region have a larger affect on labor 
participation than local market conditions. 
Farmers in B.C., the prairies and Atlantic 
Canada are more likely to work off-farm than 
farmers in Ontario and Quebec, but for fewer 
hours. Hence, gearing rural employment pro-
grams to local unemployment rates may have 
less impact on a farmer’s labor participation 
and labor supply decision than simply gear-
ing those programs to region. 
SUMMARY 
This study models off-farm labor supply as 
separate off-farm labor participation and off-
farm labor supply. This approach is preferred 
to a single-equation model of off-farm labor 
supply because several of the variables in the 
model affect participation and labor supply 
differently. Age, education and wages have 
large, significant effects on both the proba-
bility of off-farm labor participation and on 
the amount of off-farm labor supplied. 
However, increased age and education 
decrease the probability of labor participa-
tion and increase labor supply, while 
increased wages have the opposite effects. 
These opposite effects of a variable on labor 
participation and labor supply would be lost 
in a single-equation approach. 
The data used in this study are unique in 
that this is the first published study of off-
farm labor supply using Statistics Canada’s 
Agriculture-Population Linkage Database of 
census-farm operators. As such, it is a 
national study of farm operator labor alloca-
tion by farm type and region. Previous stud-
ies are either dated or have estimated off-
farm labor supply for a particular region. 
The evidence of a backward-bending 
labor supply curve is unexpected and con-
trary to findings of previous studies, but is 
consistent with the underlying theory. The 
strong positive response to wages in previous 
studies (e.g., Furtan et al 1985) is possibly 
due to using a small, regional data set or 
more likely because the single-equation 
approach confounds labor participation and 
labor supply into one response. 
Perhaps the most significant factor is 
that government efforts to stabilize and sup-
plement farm incomes through rural employ-
ment programs may have less effect on labor 
allocation decisions than do the underlying 
demographic factors of age, education and 
experience, the farm type and regional fac-
tors. Labor supply is much more elastic with 
respect to education than to government sup-
port or to local market conditions. Programs 
to increase education levels can be expected 
to have a greater impact on off-farm employ-
ment than programs geared to local market 
conditions such as the unemployment rate. 
Moreover, as the general education level 
rises along with the average age of Canadian 
farmers, the reservation wage of those farm-
ers will increase also, further decreasing the 
impact of many rural employment programs. 
NOTES 
1Several Journal reviewers have questioned 
whether farm characteristics (e.g., size and type of 
operation) and family characteristics (e.g., pres-
ence of a son and/or a spouse and the spouse’s 
type of work) should be considered exogenous to 
labor allocation decisions. The concern is that 
labor allocation decisions are jointly determined 
with farm and family characteristics. However, 
farm and family characteristics enter the model 
through the farm production function, in which 
they are considered exogenous fixed or quasi-
fixed inputs. Moreover, Bollman (1979) demon-
strated that it is theoretically consistent to model 
off-farm work and farm productivity as indepen-
dent. A relationship between labor supply and 
farm and family characteristics is expected, but 
the direction of causality is indeterminate. It may 
be more reasonable to assume that farm and fam-
ily characteristics affect short-run labor allocation 
decisions, as modeled in this paper, than that 
short-run labor allocation decisions affect long-
run farm and family structure. 
2A Journal reviewer correctly pointed out that a 
farm with only $250 of sales in a year is likely a 
hobby farm and should not be considered a com-
mercial enterprise; the results may be biased by 
including these small-scale farms. However, 
given that minimum sales of $250 was Statistics 
Canada’s definition of a farm in 1986, and that 
policies were made and programs designed based 
in part on information from this data, we decided 
to follow Statistics Canada’s lead and include all 
official designated farms in our sample. Given 
this wide range of farm size as indicated by farm 
sales, homoscedasticity is tested and not rejected. 
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